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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

## Security Committee

SECOM-D-118

30 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: [REDACTED]

Chairman

SUBJECT: Prepublication Review Project Report [REDACTED]

1. Attached is a "for the record" report by the Director of Information Services, CIA regarding the review of almost 500 publications in an effort to assist the NSC Staff in establishing a nexus between the absence of prepublication review requirements and unauthorized disclosures. In the midst of the project, the NSC Staff agreed to shift the effort to a survey of the number of disclosures which were averted through prepublication review. This latter effort was reported to Mr. deGraffenreid by SECOM-D-029 dated 13 February 1984. [REDACTED]

2. Most of the disclosures uncovered by the OIS/CIA task force, while damaging, could not be considered disastrous. The most important conclusions in [REDACTED] report appear in subparagraphs 5c and 5d. These essentially say that prepublication review has little to do with leaks, per se, and that prepublication review is a valuable way to prevent inadvertent disclosures, if it is uniformly applied at all levels. The conclusion in 5c is most important, because it recognizes that leakers will not be deterred by prepublication review agreements. The leaker is never identified by the publisher and leaking is a covert activity in the truest sense--it is not attributable. [REDACTED]

3. The primary lesson to be learned from the report is that, while we should continue to support prepublication review, we cannot consider it a way to deter or detect the perpetrators of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. [REDACTED]

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4. The report is furnished for your information. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum transmitting the OIS report to Mr. de Graffenreid, at whose request the review was begun.

## Attachment:

- A. Report from D/IS
- B. Memo to DeGraffenreid

cc: C/Publications Review Board, CIA, w/atts  
C/UDIS/SECOM, w/atts  
CIA Member, SECOM, w/atts  
D/Information Services, CIA, w/att B

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Prepared by: SECOM

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*18/5/84.*

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**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Results of Task Force Effort to Support  
Prepublication Review Element of NSDD-84 

FROM:

Director of Information Services, DA  
1206 Ames Building

EXTENSION

NO.

OIS 84-244

DATE

16 MAY 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Chairman, SECOM  
7B31 Headquarters

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Bob: Please  
treat para 5  
as an (OIS)  
news only. They  
do not represent  
necessarily (CIA)  
news.

UNCLASSIFIED when separated.

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S E C R E T

16 MAY 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM:

Director of Information Services, DA

SUBJECT:

Results of Task Force Effort to Support  
Prepublication Review Element of NSDD-84


1. To develop support for the prepublication review requirement in NSDD-84, a task force was created to review the writings of former government officials with access to SCI who had published writings not submitted for prepublication review. The Task Force was to look for classified information that had been disclosed because there was no prepublication review requirement. This was not considered to be a search for leaks, and for more on that point see paragraph 5c below. The Task Force was organized under the Office of Information Services (OIS), Directorate of Administration with additional support provided by the Directorates of Operations, Intelligence, and Science and Technology, and by the Office of Security. The Task Force was provided with a list, compiled by the National Security Council, of 536 writings published by former Government officials without the benefit of prepublication review. These included books, monographs, and articles in newspapers and journals. Before the Task Force could review all of this material and complete its work, the project was overtaken by events when implementation of NSDD-84 was suspended. This report of the Task Force results is being submitted for the record.

WARNING NOTICE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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4. None of the above compromises appear to be the initial revelation of a particular piece of information. Yet to all of those who read these items for the first time it will be news, and thus spread the knowledge of the compromise. This will be compounded by the fact that the three authors were formerly in high Government positions and experts in the field that

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they discuss. This gives great veracity to their words and worsens the damage that they can cause. It is this kind of constant hemorrhaging of our sensitive information bit by bit that feeds the perception already held by many, and that number is being added to every day, that the U.S. Government is unable to keep secrets and could be dangerous to work with where confidence and discretion are critical.

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5. Conclusions, based on the assumption that this was a representative sampling of published writings not submitted for prepublication review, were:

a. The amount of sensitive information that can be considered classified and compromised is extremely small.

b. The classified information appears in books and the more detailed articles that appear in journals rather than in articles that appear in the press.

c. We do not consider the classified information that we uncovered during this project to represent leaks, and we believe that the consideration of leaks should be kept entirely separate from the matter of prepublication review. Prepublication review concerns writings from known authors who, as CIA experience has shown, are generally agreeable to submitting their material before it is published and deleting sensitive material from it when requested to do so. This person is telling a story or offering judgments and opinions. The leaker is anonymous and reveals facts intended to achieve a specific and usually immediate objective. To lump the two groups together is to do a gross disservice to the legitimate author.

d. The persons revealing the classified information formerly held very high positions in the executive branch. These are the persons that one would normally expect to be models of discretion. Thus, it appears that if we require prepublication review it must cover everybody.

e. Do the results of this project support the argument for having prepublication review as proposed in NSDD-84? We believe that they do because so little information would have to be deleted. This means that reviews could be done quickly (they averaged 22 days in CIA in 1983); authors would be required to delete very little material from their manuscripts (almost 67 percent of the manuscripts submitted to CIA had nothing deleted in 1983, manuscripts on non-intelligence matters should have even less), and the requirement for prepublication review would send a message to the world at large that the executive branch is working to protect its secrets.

f. Should prepublication review be left voluntary? Experience has shown that the great majority of former officials will not write things that they believe are classified. As noted above, there is an occasional author who refuses to submit his manuscript for review. To handle that situation, there must be a way to penalize such persons



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when they publish classified information; otherwise, the system is meaningless. Whether they submit or not, authors can and do make mistakes in their judgment, and admittedly, much of the decision making in classification questions is subjective. It must be recognized that those still serving in the Government have the most current understanding of what has to be kept secret. They also are responsible to keep the secrets, and therefore are the only legitimate authority to declassify information. If they are to be mistrusted in that work, can former officials be trusted to write only unclassified information?

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## DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

## Security Committee

SECOM-D-119

30 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kenneth deGraffenreid  
National Security Council Staff

25X1 FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Chairman

25X1 SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures and Prepublication Review [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: SECOM-D-029, 13 February 1984, same subject

1. Reference transmitted to you a report by the CIA Prepublication Review Board (PRB) concerning the effectiveness of PRB in preventing the inadvertent publication of classified information. It also mentioned the efforts of a task force to determine how many unreviewed publications by SCI-approved individuals contained classified information. That group has now completed its efforts and its report is attached. [REDACTED]

2. Particularly noteworthy in the attachment is the conclusion that prepublication review is indispensable as a means of averting unintended disclosures, but is not a significant factor in preventing willful disclosures of classified information, or "leaks." I hope this material will be of assistance to you. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Attachment: a/s

25X1 Prepared by: SECOM [REDACTED]

## Distribution:

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When Separated from Attachment

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DECL OADR

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-029

13 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kenneth deGraffenreid  
National Security Council Staff

NSC  
Rm 300  
old 603

25X1 FROM:

Chairman

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures and Prepublication Review

1. In response to your request and that of Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard, attached is a report on unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and the possible effect of prepublication review.

2. The report, prepared by CIA's Prepublication Review Board (PRB), discusses two cases of damaging publications which were not submitted for prepublication review and six cases in which prepublication review prevented damaging disclosures. It also advises that, of the 1,129 items submitted to the PRB, almost one-third have contained classified information. As I advised you recently, the task force reviewing material published by SCI-approved individuals has found only three of the 500 publications reviewed which appear to contain classified information. The group has not yet concluded its efforts.

3. I hope the attached material will be helpful to you. Although the cases have been sanitized to some extent, their potential for serious damage to the national security requires careful handling.

Chairman

Attachment:  
As Stated

SECOM-D-029

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee w/atts
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9 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

FROM:   
Chairman, Publications Review Board

SUBJECT: Value of Prepublication Review

1. Per your request, attached is information taken from CIA's PRB records designed to illustrate the value of prepublication review.

2. Please call on me for any additional assistance you may require.

Attachment:  
As stated

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS


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The prepublication review process at CIA has enabled the protection of thousands of the US Government's most sensitive secrets. Before examining specific examples, it is worth noting the consequences of books written by persons with authorized access to classified information which were not reviewed prior to publication but which did contain classified information.

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